Introduction and Background
The law of negligence holds injurers responsible for the damages they inflict on their victims only if they have not met the applicable standard of care. Under U.S. law, the standard usually applied is called the "reasonable person" standard. Under this rule, if the level of care taken is consistent with that which would have been taken by a reasonable person, then there is no liability and the victim bears the full cost of his or her injuries.
Thus, if a person takes appropriate care, there is no reason to purchase liability insurance 1 .
The existence of a thriving market for negligence liability insurance, including both personal and commercial lines, implies that the current structure of liability law exposes market participants to some type of risk that can be managed more costeffectively by purchasing insurance. Although a few previous papers have considered the relationship between the structure of liability law and the market for liability insurance, (notably, Shavell, 1982 (notably, Shavell, , 1987 (notably, Shavell, , 1992 Sarath, 1991; and Crocker and Doherty, 2000) , several issues remain.
For some types of negligence, such as those incurred through operation of an automobile or ownership of a home, the market for negligence liability insurance is affected by mandatory coverage requirements imposed by law (mandatory auto liability 1 This paper considers the market for negligence liability insurance only. There is a substantial body of literature focused on the relative efficiency of the different rules for determining liability, such as strict liability verus negligence (e.g., Landes and Posner, 1987 , Miceli, 2004 , Posner, 2003 , Shavell, 1987 . The central issues in this literature have been: 1) determining the socially optimal level of accident prevention activities (care) and; 2) evaluating the ability of the different rules for determining liability to create incentives for economic agents to choose the appropriate level of care in different economic environments.
coverage) or contract (as a condition for a mortgage loan). The markets for other types of negligence liability insurance, such as medical malpractice, professional liability, and commercial general liability insurance, are more difficult to explain since knowledge of the standard of care would imply that every potential injurer could simply meet the standard of care and would never be liable.
This suggests that a market for liability insurance will arise only if there is uncertainty in the operation of the legal system, either in standards of care or application of the law by jurors and/or courts (Shavell, 2000) or if market participants have incomplete information about the risks and/or level of care. Craswell and Calfee (1986) and Shavell (1987) both show that uncertainty in standards of due care increases the level of care beyond the socially optimal level. Shavell (1992) considers the optimality of information acquisition under several different liability rules 2 and finds that the type of negligence rule can result in socially suboptimal levels of care (either too much or too little). Notably, none of these models incorporate liability insurance and therefore do not answer the question of whether the uncertain operation of the legal system can lead to a market for liability insurance. Crocker and Doherty (2000) suggest that the ignorance of potential injurers may provide a motive for the purchase of liability insurance. They assume that potential injurers are either good risks or bad risks where bad (good) risks have a high (low) probability of injuring someone. The legal standard of care is assumed to depend on the 2 Shavell (1992) contrasts the outcome under four types of negligence rules which differ in whether liability is based on the injurer's decision to become informed and the injurer's decision to take care: 1) "complete negligence" which requires the optimal level of care given the optimal acquisition of information; 2)negligence based on the optimal level of care given the optimal acquisition of information; 3) negligence based on the optimal level of care given actual information; and 4) negligence based on the optimal level of care assuming the injurer obtained information. In addition, their model assumes that courts always apply a negligence rule in which the standard of care is based on perfect observation of risk type and actual level of care (only one of four possible rules considered in Shavell, 1992) .
A second important issue is that Crocker and Doherty assume that the decision to become informed about risk type (and hence to buy insurance) results in perfect revelation of risk type to the insurer. It is well-known that mandatory disclosure discourages individuals from becoming informed (e.g. Matthews and Postlewaite, 1985) .
Similarly, Shavell (2000) finds that when the rule of negligence is dependent on the injurer's actual knowledge of risk type and optimal level of care, there is incentive to remain uninformed. While there are some obvious examples where partial risk-type information becomes public, such as negative information reported to the CLUE system, it seems equally plausible that informed potential injurers' risk type remains private information, and that potential injurers have the option to reveal all or some of it. It is also well-known that voluntary disclosure encourages individuals to become informed
and to reveal what they learn, particularly when the information reported will justify a lower risk classification (e.g., Viscusi, 1978 In the first model, we assume that the legal system applies a uniform standard of due care to all individuals. Uninformed consumers act "as if" they are average individuals. Under the uniform negligence rule, informed bad risks always meet the standard of care and never insure. The demand for insurance, if any, comes from the informed good risks. The informed good risks insure only if the cost of doing so is less than the cost of meeting the due care standard. The information disclosure environment is not important for this conclusion. Even if informed good risks cannot communicate their status to insurers (so that adverse selection problems arise) the value of information is positive and a market for insurance can arise.
In the second model, we assume that courts apply an individualized standard of care. Under the individualized negligence rule, it is the uninformed parties that may wish to insure. However, this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that insurance companies can distinguish informed from uninformed parties. If they cannot so distinguish, then informed bad risks may masquerade as uninformed, leading to an adverse selection problem. In the resulting equilibrium, potential injurers become informed, meet the appropriate standard of care and do not demand insurance
The next section describes the assumptions of the model, defines the negligence rules and discusses the value of information. The third and fourth sections analyze the incentives to become informed and to insure under the uniform and individualized negligence rules. The final section provides brief concluding remarks.
The Basic Model.

Assumptions. The analytical model is an extension of the standard model of accidents
in the law and economics literature (e.g., Shavell 1982 Shavell , 1987 Shavell , 2004 . For simplicity, we assume that accidents are unilateral, that is, only the potential injurer's care affects the probability of an accident. We also assume the accidents are "between strangers," that is, there is no contractual relationship that the potential victim can use to provide incentives for the potential injurer to take care.
Let x denote the potential injurer's expenditure on accident prevention or "care."
Let π G (x) (resp., π B (x)) be the probability of an accident when a "good" type (resp., "bad" type) spends x on care. The probability of an accident is a decreasing, convex function of care. The good type have a lower accident probability than the bad type for any level of care, 0 < π G (x) < π B (x) < 1, and have a higher marginal product of care,
Let θ G and θ B be the proportions of good and bad risks and let d be the damage suffered by victims.
An important aspect of the analysis here is that potential injurers do not necessarily know whether they are good or bad risks. However, they do know that they are good or bad risks with probabilities θ G and θ B . We use the subscript U to denote uninformed potential injurers. Then uninformed potential injurers estimate their probability of an accident as
Potential injurers have initial wealth w > d and the von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function u, which is strictly increasing and strictly concave. Potential victims have initial wealth y. We assume victims are risk neutral, since this leads to a simple characterization of the liability rule. Individuals know whether they are a potential injurer or a potential victim.
An insurance policy consists of a premium, p, and an indemnity, q, paid in the event the policyholder is liable for damages to a victim. If the potential injurer buys the insurance policy (p i , q i ) and expends x i on care, then their expected utility is
We assume that the liability standard is perfectly enforced so there is no uncertainty in the definition or application of the negligence rule. This implies that victims, courts and insurers can perfectly verify both the injurer's type and the injurer's level of care if an accident occurs. Since victims and courts can verify the injurer's care, we assume care is observable. This implies that the insurance premium can depend on the level of care. 3 We assume throughout that the insurance market is competitive and that insurers earn zero expected profit, given the information they have about policyholders. The zero expected profit constraint is then
Since the premium is actuarially fair, if potential injurers insure, they will choose full coverage (q = d) and choose the level of care that minimizes the total cost of accidents and care,
The timing of the model is as shown in Figure 1 . Potential injurers, victims and the courts are initially symmetrically uninformed about whether injurers are good or bad risks. Potential injurers then have the opportunity to learn their type. Potential injurers may then purchase liability insurance. We consider the case where the potential injurer can provide verifiable proof of their type to the insurance company. We also consider cases where the potential injurer can provide less information to the insurance company.
After the potential injurers have decided whether or not to buy insurance, they choose the level of care; the level of care is observable. Nature then determines whether or not an accident occurs. If an accident occurs, the courts costlessly determine the injurer's type and apply the negligence rule to determine liability.
Negligence Rules.
A uniform negligence rule applies the same standard of due care to all potential injurers. In effect, all potential injurers are treated as if they are average.
Definition 1: Under the uniform negligence rule, an injurer is negligent if x < x U *, where
This is the well-known Hand Rule, that injurers are negligent if the social burden of the untaken precaution is less than the expected social harm. Thus, injurers are fully liable for damages to victims and the standard of care minimizes the total cost of accidents and care. Shavell (1982) shows that, if injurers are identical and victims are risk neutral, the uniform negligence rule achieves the first best outcome. Also, since potential injurers meet the standard of care and are never negligent, they bear no risk. It is interesting to note that Shavell (2000) does not consider this particular version of the negligence rule in his analysis.
The individualized negligence rule sets different standards of care, x G * and x B *, for good and bad risks. Type G injurers with probability π G (x G ) and by type B injurers with probability π B (x B ).
Definition 2: Under the individualized negligence rule, an injurer is negligent if they are of type i and x i < x i *, where
Again, injurers are fully liable for damages to victims, the standards of care minimize the total cost of accidents and care for each type of potential injurer, as well as in the aggregate. Potential injurers meet the appropriate standard of care and bear no risk. The argument in Shavell (1982) shows that, if victims are risk neutral, the individualized negligence rule achieves the first best outcome. Finally, the assumptions on the loss probabilities imply that x G * < x U * < x B *.
Under the uniform negligence rule, good risks are required to take too much care to meet the standard, while bad risks are required to take too little. This increases the total social cost of accidents plus expenditure on care relative to the individualized negligence rule. This leads to the question of why the uniform rule would be used. As Landes and Posner (1987, pp. 123-131) point out, the inefficiency of the uniform rule must be compared to the information costs of determining individual standards of care.
The widespread use of the reasonable person standard implies that, in most cases, these information costs are high. As they point out (p. 127) "In types of cases where the information costs of departing from the average-man standard are low because the gap between the average individual's due care standard and that of the individual defendant is large and palpable, the courts, as predicted, recognize a different standard."
Value of Information.
We measure the value of information as the expected increase in expected utility from becoming informed. Let z = (p, q, x) be the arguments of the potential injurers expected utility function. Let ẑ i maximize expected utility for an individual of type i = B, G, U, subject to any relevant constraints. Then the value of information is the gain in expected utility from becoming informed:
A possible objection to this definition is that individuals who wish to become informed must expend resources to become informed. An alternative approach to measuring the value of information is the decision-maker's willingness to pay, that is, the reduction in wealth that makes informed expected utility equal to uninformed expected utility. However, the two approaches are equivalent, that is, the value of information is positive if, and only if, willingness to pay is positive.
Uniform Negligence Rule
We now consider the question of whether potential injurers will become informed about their type and whether a market for liability insurance will arise when the negligence rule is uniform.
We assume that, if they become informed, potential injurers can provide verifiable proof of their type to the insurer. Uninformed potential injurers meet the standard of care and have utility u(w -x U *) and have no demand for insurance. If injurers become informed and learn that they are bad risks, then they meet the standard of care and have utility u(w -x U *). If there is a demand for liability insurance, then it must come from informed good risks.
Proposition 1: Assuming a uniform negligence standard and that insurers can verify informed potential injurers' risk-type, then: (a) good risks fully insure (q = d) and expend x G * on accident prevention and (b) the value of information is nonnegative if, and only if,
Proof: If injurers learn that they are good risks, then they may be better off to choose a lower level of care and insure against the resulting liability exposure. Since they can verify their type, the premium is actuarially fair, π G (x)q. The informed good risks then fully insure and choose the level of care, x G *, to minimize their total cost of accidents plus care. This yields utility u(w -
d). Then the value of information is
Then the value of information is non-negative if, and only if, the inequality in (3.1) holds.
If the inequality in (3.1) does not hold, then potential injurers remain uninformed, expend
x U * on accident prevention and do not insure. || That is, the value of information is non-negative if the savings in accident prevention expenditures exceed the insurance premium. If the inequality in (3.1) holds then potential injurers become informed and the informed good risks buy liability insurance. If the inequality in (3.1) is reversed, then potential injurers remain uniformed and there is no demand for liability insurance. Also, whether the inequality in (3.1) holds depends on proportions of good and bad risks, the loss probabilities, and damages (which determine x G * and x U *). Whether the inequality holds does not depend on potential injurers' attitudes toward risk.
The insurance policy bought by the good risks is also attractive to the uninformed and to bad risks. The insurance company was able to offer the policy since it could identify the goods risks and exclude others from purchasing the policy. For example, suppose that the insurance company cannot verify whether potential injurers are informed or uninformed. Then, since it cannot exclude the uninformed, the insurance company faces an adverse selection problem and must take this into account in designing the policy. That is, the policy must satisfy the self-selection constraint
We let q G denote the level of coverage and x G denote the equilibrium level of care take by informed good risks.
Proposition 2: Assuming a uniform negligence standard and that insurers cannot verify whether potential injurers are informed, then, if the self-selection constraint (3.3) is binding: (a) good risks less than fully insure ( q G < d) and increase expenditure on accident prevention ( x G > x G *) and (b) the value of information is non-negative.
Proof:
Let q G and x G maximize U G (π G (x)q, q, x) subject to the self-selection constraint, and assume that the self-selection constraint in (3.3) is binding. Observe that if q = d and x = x G *, the constraint is violated. Since the constraint is binding, we must have q G < d, and since the good risks are less than fully insured, x G > x G *.
, the value of information is positive. || uninformed potential injurers, but may be unable to determine whether informed injurers are good or bad risks. Then the self-selection constraint becomes
Then a result analogous to Proposition 2 holds. We let G q denote the coverage and G x denote the expenditure on care.
Proposition 3: Assuming a uniform negligence standard and that insurers can verify whether potential injurers are informed but cannot verify their type, then, if the self-selection constraint (3.5) is binding: (a) good risks less than fully insure ( G q < d) and increase expenditure on accident prevention ( G x > x G *) and (b) the value of information is non-negative.
This follows from the same argument as Proposition 2. Also, we have (a) G q ≤ G q and G x ≥ G x with at least one strict inequality and,
The inability of insurers to distinguish individuals' information status or to distinguish informed individuals' type makes the good risks worse off since u(w -x G * -
. This fact, combined with a binding self-selection constraint in either (3.3) or (3.4), implies that the inequality in (3.1) must hold. Therefore, the inequality in (3.1) is a necessary condition for the value of information to be positive.
Conversely, if the inequality in (3.1) is reversed, then whether or not insurance companies can distinguish informed from uninformed potential injurers or informed good risks from bad risks, the value of information is always negative and there is no demand for liability insurance.
Individualized Negligence Rule.
We now consider the case of the individualized negligence rule. In this case, the standards of care are x G * for the good types and x B * for the bad types. As before, the premium for each type depends on the level of care chosen. If potential injurers become informed, they can meet the appropriate standard of care, are never liable and have no reason to buy liability insurance. If potential injurers do not know whether they are a good or bad risks, then they face uncertainty over the standard of care they must meet to avoid liability. If there is a demand for liability insurance, it must arise from uninformed potential injurers.
Consider again the consultant example, more specifically a consultant offering expert litigation services. In this situation, the good risks are well-informed, welleducated, and experienced. The bad risks have lower qualifications and experience.
Neither type is familiar with factors that might make them have higher or lower probability of being sued for negligence. Information can be obtained on the sources of liability a consultant may be subject to, e.g. failure to consult certain references, failure to do certain types of analysis. This information tells the person whether she is a good risk or a bad risk. If uninformed about risk type, the consultant will buy insurance. The consultant will only choose to become informed if the expected reduction in costs of care
(that necessary to get the lower premium compared to the level necessary to avoid liability if uninformed) exceed the insurance premium. Informed good risks will buy insurance (which is cheap for them) and choose a lower level of care. Informed bad risks will meet the standard of care (because insurance is too expensive).
level of care and on the courts ex post determination of their type in the event of an accident. Since x G * < x B *, if the potential injurer chooses a level of care less than x G *, the injurer is always negligent. If the potential injurer chooses a level of care between
x G * and x B *, the injurer is only negligent if they are a bad risk. If the potential injurer chooses a level of care of at least x B *, the injurer is never negligent. The ex ante probability that an uninformed injurer will be negligent is then
Now consider the decision of an uninformed potential injurer to purchase insurance.
Proposition 4: Assuming an individualized negligence standard, if insurers can verify that an individual is uninformed and the uninformed purchase insurance: (a) the uninformed fully insure (q = d) and choose the level of care U x = argmin
x < x U * and (c) the value of information is negative if
Proof: (a) Since the premium is actuarially fair, individuals fully insure and choose the level of care to minimize their total cost of accidents plus care
x G *, the first inequality can be written as
The second inequality follows from the definition of π U (x) and the fact that π' U (x U *)d = −1. Therefore, U x < x U *. (c) Since they fully insure, uninformed potential injurers have expected utility u(w -U x -
Then the value of information is
Then the concavity of u implies the value of information is negative. ||
Crocker and Doherty (2000) also prove part (a) and that x G * ≤ U x . However, we provide a sharper upper bound on U x and provide a sufficient condition for the value of information to be negative.
Proposition 4 assumes that uninformed individuals purchase insurance.
Alternatively, they may choose to remain uninsured and simply exercise care. Expected utility for uninformed, uninsured individuals is
where Π(x) is given by (4.1). Let U x be the level of care chosen by uninformed uninsured potential injurers so that U U ( U x ) is the resulting level of expected utility.
Since these individuals retain some risk, we can find a risk premium, R > 0, such that
Then uninformed individuals will insure if, and only if,
This inequality is more likely to hold the greater the degree of risk aversion and the smaller the proportion of bad risks in the population.
Proposition 4 also assumes that insurance companies can verify that potential injurers are uninformed. This may be difficult to do, since it is easier for the knowledgeable to feign ignorance than for the ignorant to feign knowledge. Then informed bad risks may prefer to masquerade as uninformed. This creates an adverse selection problem. The policy offered by the insurance company must satisfy the selfselection constraint
We let U q denote the level of coverage and U x the equilibrium level of care taken by uninformed potential injurers. 
where
Substituting from the self-selection constraint, writing out the expression for U B and canceling like terms yields
Using the fact that θ G + θ B = 1 and substituting into the last term, this reduces to 
Conclusions
In this paper we address the question of whether potential injurers' ignorance about their risk type is sufficient to create a demand for liability insurance under a negligence rule. That is, we assume the liability rule is the simple rule of negligence and that the negligence rule is perfectly enforced by the courts. We also assume that potential injurers, victims and the courts are initially uninformed about potential injurers' risk type.
The issues are then (1) whether potential injurers will learn their risk type and (2) whether they will buy liability insurance.
We find that the answers to both questions depend on whether the negligence rule is uniform or individualized. If the negligence rule is individualized, then the answer also depends on the information disclosure environment. The uniform negligence rule applies the same standard of care to all individuals. Under this rule, the demand for liability insurance arises from the informed good risks. Informed good risks do not meet the standard of care and insure against the resulting liability risk. Informed bad risks meet the standard of care and are not negligent. Under the uniform negligence rule, the information disclosure environment is not important. Informed good risks are willing to voluntarily verify their type. However, even if they cannot, the value of information is positive and a market for liability insurance can arise. A necessary condition is that the expenditure on accident prevention required to meet the negligence standard is greater than the total cost of care and insurance.
The individualized negligence rule applies different standards of care to good and bad risks. Under this rule, the demand for liability insurance arises from the uninformed.
Under the individualized negligence rule, the information disclosure environment is important. Insurance companies must be able to determine whether individuals are informed or uninformed. This would seem to require a perfectly enforced mandatory disclosure rule. Otherwise, informed bad risks may masquerade as uninformed potential injurers creating an adverse selection problem. If this occurs, then the value of information is positive, informed good and bad risks meet the relevant standard of care and do not demand liability insurance.
